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I. INTRODUCTION
When Colman Chadam’s parents learned their son had genetic markers
consistent with cystic fibrosis (CF), they probably did not realize that those
markers would one day affect what school Colman could attend.1 Unfortunately,
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2018; B.A.,
Marketing, Taylor University, 2013. Many thanks to Professor Brian Slocum for his immeasurable input on the
substance of this comment. I am also immensely grateful to the law review board and primary editors for their
tireless efforts in ensuring that this comment was technically correct. Finally, and most importantly, thank you
to Ashley, my wife, for your endless support and for being my partner in this crazy life.
1. Sarah Zhang, DNA Got a Kid Kicked out of School–and It Will Happen Again, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2016,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/schools-kicked-boy-based-dna/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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that is exactly what happened in 2012 when school officials at Jordan Middle
School in Palo Alto, California learned of Colman’s genetic markers.2 The school
officials decided to send him to another school because they feared he, and two
other students with CF, posed cross-threats to each other.3 People were outraged
when they heard the story, and some saw the story as a harbinger of a dystopian
future in which genetics determines all aspects of life.4 In California, however,
such a dystopian future may not be as inevitable as Chadam’s situation might
suggest, because California law may already prohibit public schools from
treating Chadam as Jordan Middle School did.5 This Comment uses the facts of
Chadam’s case as a framework for exploring whether CalGINA, California’s
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, does in fact prohibit Jordan Middle
School’s conduct.6
First, however, some background information on genetics is in order because it
will provide valuable context for analyzing whether CalGINA applies to Chadam’s
situation.7 Accordingly, Part II(A) provides a brief history of the study of genetics.8
Part II(B) discusses what genetic information discrimination is, its history, and its
existence today.9 Part III details existing legislation protecting against genetic
information discrimination in the United States, California, and two other states,
respectively.10 Parts IV and V discuss Chadam’s case and whether CalGINA applies
to his situation.11 Assuming CalGINA does apply to public schools, this Comment
explores whether existing law furnishes an exception that exempts the school from
CalGINA’s requirements.12 Finally, a variation of the facts in Chadam’s case
demonstrates the need for an exception to genetic information nondiscrimination
laws that allows schools to discriminate on the basis of genetic information when a
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Barry Starr, Palo Alto Student Asked to Leave School Because of His DNA, KQED (Feb. 8, 2016)
http://ww2.kqed.org/futureofyou/2016/02/08/student-was-asked-to-leave-school-because-of-his-dna/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (referencing Gattaca, a movie that portrays a world in which
people who are not genetically engineered are considered “in-valids,” precluded from various professions, and
relegated to menial jobs).
5. See infra Parts V.A–B (discussing whether CalGINA applies to public schools and if so, whether the
school’s conduct falls within the scope of what CalGINA prohibits).
6. See infra Part V.A. (discussing whether CalGINA applies to public schools); infra Part V.B (discussing
whether the school’s conduct in Chadam’s case falls within the scope of what CalGINA prohibits).
7. See infra Part II.A–B, III (discussing, respectively, genetics, the study thereof, the history of genetic
information discrimination, and existing legislation).
8. See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of genetics).
9. See infra Part II.B (discussing historical and more recent instances of genetic information
discrimination).
10. See infra Part III (discussing existing legislation).
11. See infra Part IV (describing the facts of Chadam’s case); Part V (exploring whether CalGINA
applies to public schools and whether the school’s conduct constituted discrimination).
12. See infra Part V.B.3 (discussing whether there is an existing exception that would have justified
Jordan Middle School’s conduct); see also infra Part VII (proposing an exception to existing law that would
have justified Jordan Middle School’s conduct if Chadam had actually had CF).
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school learns, through genetic information, that a student poses an imminent threat to
other students, teachers, or staff. 13
II. GENETICS
Analyzing CalGINA and whether it applies to Chadam’s case warrants a
discussion of the history of genetics and genetic information discrimination.14
A. Heredity’s Heritage
Gregor Mendel is considered the “father of genetics.”15 During his famous
pea-plant experiments in the 1860s, Mendel discovered dominant and recessive
traits and the principles that govern inheritance.16 While at the time Charles
Darwin’s theory of evolution overshadowed Mendel’s work, scientists
rediscovered Mendel’s research and theories on inheritance in the early 1900s
and consider them foundational principles in both biology and genetics.17
Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, scientists continued
learning more about inheritance and genetics.18 Importantly, in 1944, Oswald
Avery concluded that DNA was the medium through which people inherit
traits.19 Seven years later, a century’s worth of work culminated in Watson and
Crick’s discovery of the shape of DNA: the now-iconic double helix.20
In 1990, the National Institute of Health and the Department of Energy
launched the Human Genome Project.21 The Project’s goal was to sequence each
of the 3 billion base pairs that comprise the human genome.22 They completed
the project in 2003.23 Since then, researchers have discovered more than 1800
disease genes and developed more than 2000 genetic tests for various human
conditions.24 Although these discoveries produced immense medical and
scientific benefits, many people worry that easy access to genetic information
13. See infra Part VII (proposing an exception to existing law that would have justified Jordan Middle
School’s conduct if Chadam had actually had CF).
14. See infra Part II.A–B (providing the context for the legal and social landscape in which the Chadam’s
case takes place).
15. Abigail Lauren Perdue, Justifying GINA, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2011).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Genetics, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/genetics (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. Id.
20. J.D. Watson & F.H. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose
Nucleic Acid, 4356 NATURE 737, 737–38 (1953).
21. Human Genome Project, NAT’L INST. HEALTH https://report.nih.gov/nihfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.
aspx?csid=45 (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. Id.; Perdue, supra note 15, at 1057–58.
23. NAT’L INST. HEALTH supra note 21.
24. Id.
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will provide a new basis for discrimination.25 Because our understanding of
genetics is relatively new, it is no surprise that genetic information discrimination
is not rampant—but it does exist.26
B. Genetic Information Discrimination
There is great debate about the extent to which people discriminate against
each other because of genetic information.27 According to the Council for
Responsible Genetics, there are hundreds of documented cases of genetic
information discrimination, most of which occur in the employment and
insurance contexts.28 Some examples include: “seven-year-old Danny,” who had
“a gene predisposing him to a heart disorder,” which an insurance company used
to justify denying him coverage despite the fact that, other than taking
medication to minimize the risk of a heart attack, he was healthy; Jonathon,
whose health coverage was eliminated when he was diagnosed with Fragile X
Syndrome, which forced his mother to quit her job so they could qualify for
Medicaid; and Kim, who was fired one week after her employer discovered that
her mother died of Huntington’s disease, despite her receiving outstanding
performance reviews.29 Critics, however, emphasize the need to investigate
whether claims like these are legitimate because they are often based on
subjective, unverified, individual accounts.30 Often implicit in such criticism is
the sentiment that non-discrimination laws are premature.31 But proponents of
genetic nondiscrimination laws argue their rather preemptive nature cuts the
other way, extolling the benefits of addressing discrimination before it becomes
rampant.32 But regardless of the extent to which genetic discrimination exists
today, there is a history of genetic discrimination in the United States,33 and there
are at least some recent instances of genetic information discrimination, both of

25. Rivka Jungreis, Comment, Fearing Fear Itself: The Proposed Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act, 15 J. L. POL’Y 211, 212 (2007).
26. See infra Part II.B (discussing both historical and more modern instances of genetic discrimination).
27. Jeffrey Morrow, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98 GEO.
L.J. 215, 222 (2009); see Jungreis, supra note 25, at 226–27.
28. COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: POSITION PAPER (2001), available
at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/2RSW5M2HJ2.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. Id.
30. Cases of Genetic Information Discrimination, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/12513976/cases-of-genetic-discrimination/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
31. See Health Law–Genetics–Congress Restricts Use of Genetic Information by Insurers and Employers,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1043 (2009) (concluding that GINA was premature); Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting
Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 441
(2010).
32. Roberts, supra note 31, at 441.
33. Infra Part II.B.1 (describing historical genetic discrimination in the United States).
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which inform and frame the current policy debate.34 The following two sections
address, respectively, the history of genetic information discrimination in the
United States and some recent instances thereof.35
1. A History of Genetic Discrimination
In the early 1900s, the United States embraced the “eugenics” movement’s
goal of “improving the quality of the stock.”36 Proponents of eugenics sought to
accomplish this goal by discouraging procreation amongst the so-called “genetic
underclass” (those who were physically or intellectually inferior) through
coerced sterilization and promoting procreation between those considered
genetically superior (those who were physically or intellectually superior).37 As
one eugenicist put it, “The superficially sympathetic man flings a coin to the
beggar; the more deeply sympathetic man builds an almshouse for him so that he
need no longer beg; but perhaps the most radically sympathetic of all is the man
who arranges that the beggar not be born.”38
Starting with Indiana in 1907, many states passed sterilization laws.39 In
Buck v. Bell, America’s most famous instance of forced sterilization, the
Supreme Court upheld a Virginia sterilization statute as it was applied to Ms.
Carrie Buck, who, as the court put it, was an 18-year-old “feeble minded” woman
who was the daughter of a “feeble-minded” woman and the mother of a “feebleminded child.”40 In Buck, Justice Holmes, expressing a sentiment similar to that
of the “sympathetic man” described above, noted “it is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”41
In 1910, the Department of Genetics of the Carnegie Institution of
Washington established the Eugenics Records Office that conducted genetic
research on both cacogenic42 and unsocial families and aristogenic43 families44 to
34. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing some more modern instances of genetic information in the United States).
35. Infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing, respectively, historic and modern instances of genetic discrimination
in the United States).
36. Perdue, supra note 15, at 1098.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
41. Id. at 207.
42. Webster’s defines “cacogenic” as “dysgenic” or “relating to Cacogenesis.” Cacogenic, WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cacogenic (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review). “Dysgenic” is further defined as “tending to promote survival of or
reproduction by less well-adapted individuals (as the weak or diseased) especially at the expense of welladapted individuals (as the strong or healthy).” Dysgenic, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/dysgenic (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review). “Cacogenesis” is defined as an “inability to produce hybrids that are both viable and fertile” or “racial
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give advice on who was “fit for marriage.”45 While the atrocities the Nazis
committed during WWII to advance eugenics ultimately turned public opinion
against the movement,46 even as late as 1971, the geneticist Bentley Glass
supported “the right of every child to be born with a sound physical and mental
constitution, based on a sound genotype.”47 He claimed parents would one day
have no “right to burden society with a malformed or a mentally incompetent
child.”48 Fortunately, Glass’s prophecy has not come true, but this history of
eugenics demonstrates genetic information is not entirely new and provides a
foundation for concern as our understanding of and ability to alter DNA
continues to develop.49
2. Genetic Information Discrimination Today
There are more recent instances of genetic information discrimination as
well.50 In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the plaintiffs,
both current and former employees of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL),
brought ADA, Title VII, and privacy claims against LBL, alleging that the
employer tested their blood and urine for sickle-cell disease, syphilis, and
pregnancy without their knowledge or consent.51 The District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed all of the claims as barred by the
statutes of limitations, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the Title VII
and constitutional claims.52 LBL eventually settled with the plaintiffs.53
Another example involved the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad.54 The

deterioration especially when due to the retention of inferior breeding stock.” Cacogenesis, WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cacogenesis (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. “Aristogenic” is the adjective form of “aristogenesis,” which Webster’s defines as “a theory now not
widely accepted in biology: evolution is the product of a continuous orderly creative faculty innate in living
matter and manifested in response to external stimuli at such a rate that perfection of an adaptation anticipates
the need of that adaptation.” Aristogenic, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/aristogenic (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
44. Charles B. Davenport, The Work of the Eugenics Records Office, 15 EUGENICS REV. 305, 315 (Apr.
1923).
45. Perdue, supra note 15, at 1098.
46. Health Law–Genetics, supra note 31, at 1039.
47. Perdue, supra note 15, at 1098.
48. Id.
49. Supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the history of genetic information discrimination in the United States).
50. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing more modern instances of genetic information discrimination in the
United States).
51. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).
52. Id.
53. Roberts, supra note 31, at 465.
54. Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Settles ADA Suit Against BNSF for
Genetic Bias (Apr. 18, 2001), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-18-01.cfm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against the
railroad because it was testing employees, without their knowledge or consent,
for a genetic condition that caused carpel tunnel syndrome.55 The Railroad
quickly settled with the EEOC and agreed to all of the EEOC’s demands.56
While neither case resulted in a court ruling, both highlight how genetic
information potentially presents a new means of discriminating.57 Both cases also
provide a contextual backdrop for the circumstances in which Congress passed
GINA, the first major legislation addressing genetic information discrimination.58
III. GENETIC INFORMATION DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Various states began prohibiting genetic information laws in the mid-1990s,
but the federal government did not follow suit until 2008 when it passed the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).59 In 2011, California passed
its own genetic information protection law, commonly known as CalGINA.60
Other states have similar laws that extend protections to a wide variety of
extents.61
A. GINA: History and Substance
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter and Senator Olympia Snowe first
attempted to address genetic information discrimination with the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act in Health Insurance of 1995.62 The bill failed
to pass either house.63 Various iterations of the bill were reintroduced in each of
the next five legislative sessions, but Congress did not pass any of them.64 With
time, however, the political climate tilted in favor of GINA.65 In 2008, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act garnered broad support and passed

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra Part III.B (describing the facts of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railroad cases, both of which are instances of employers using genetic information to make
certain decisions).
58. See infra Part IV (discussing GINA).
59. President Bush Signed GINA into Law!, COALITION FOR GENETIC FAIRNESS, http://www.genetic
fairness.org/act.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
60. SB 559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
61. See infra Part III.C (describing the laws of West Virginia and Utah).
62. Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., https://www.genome.gov/
10002077/#al-4 (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The New Genetic Nondiscrimination Act, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, http://www.
councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/PGWOGJ2F3O.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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in the House 414–1 and in the Senate 95–0, and President Bush signed the bill
into law shortly thereafter.66 “Senator Ted Kennedy applauded GINA as ‘the first
civil rights bill of the [21st] century.’”67
GINA defines genetic information as “information about (i) [an] individual’s
genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii)
the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such
individual.”68 It further defines genetics tests as “an analysis of human DNA,
RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations,
or chromosomal changes.”69
Title I of GINA prohibits group plans and individual health insurers from
discriminating based on genetic information in health insurance.70 Specifically,
insurers are not allowed to require, request, or purchase genetic information to
use in eligibility, coverage, underwriting, or premium decisions.71 Additionally,
insurers may not require genetic tests, nor can insurers request genetic tests
outside of a few narrowly defined circumstances.72 Title II prohibits similar
conduct in the employment context.73 It prevents employers from using genetic
information in firing, hiring, promotion, or pay decisions and does not allow
them to require or request genetic tests as a condition of employment unless
certain narrow exceptions apply.74
Legislators faced many difficulties trying to pass this bill.75 Opponents of
GINA worried about the burdens GINA might place on industry.76 In addition,
the lack of documented cases of genetic discrimination prompted some to
question whether the bill was even necessary.77 Proponents, on the other hand,
believed that protecting against genetic information discrimination would
assuage the public’s fears of this discrimination, thereby prompting them to take
advantage of genetic testing benefits and ultimately ushering in a new era of
personalized medicine.78 But given that only 6% of adults have ever undergone
66. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 63.
67. COALITION FOR GENETIC FAIRNESS, supra note 60.
68. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101(d)(7)(A), 122 Stat.
881, 885.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 883.
71. Id. at 883, 888, 896.
72. Id. at 883–84, 888–89, 896–97.
73. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101(d)(7)(A), 122 Stat.
881, 907–13.
74. Id. at 907–13. It is worth noting here that GINA would likely have protected Danny, Jonathon, and
Kim, the examples mentioned above from the Council for Responsible Genetics.
75. COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, supra note 66.
76. Congress Restricts Use of Genetic Information by Insurers and Employers, supra note 31; COUNCIL
FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, supra note 66.
77. See Zhang, supra note 1.
78. Press Release, Rep Slaughter Celebrates Signing of GINA Bill, (May 21, 2008), https://louise.
house.gov/media-center/press-releases/may-21-2008-rep-slaughter-celebrates-signing-gina-bill (on file with The
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genetic testing, it is clear society has not yet realized that vision of a new era of
personalized medicine.79 That statistic, however, is not necessarily a
condemnation of GINA’s effectiveness so much as it may be a result of the lack
of treatments for conditions genetic testing might discover.80 Indeed, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to gauge GINA’s effectiveness because it is largely a
preemptive law.81 Nonetheless, it seems the more people find out about GINA,
the more they use it.82 Since GINA became law in 2008, people have notified the
EEOC of over 1,000 GINA violations,83 and when the EEOC took its first case to
trial in 2015, the court awarded two employees $2.25 million.84 This suggests
that the law has had some effect.85 Still, many claim GINA does not go far
enough and alternative methods are superior.86 For example, some scholars
advocate for a privacy rights based approach to protecting against genetic
information discrimination.87 Other scholars believe GINA should include
disparate impact provisions.88 Additionally, some scholars highlight the need for
extending protections to additional contexts and broadening the scope of the
protections themselves.89 While states’ approaches to protecting against genetic

University of the Pacific Law Review)
79. HARVARD T. H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC AND GENETIC EDITING, TESTING, AND
THERAPY (2017), available at https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/94/2016/01/STATHarvard-Poll-Jan-2016-Genetic-Technology.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
80. Sharon Begley, Consumers Aren’t Wild About Genetic Testing–Nor Are Doctors, STAT (Feb. 12,
2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/12/consumers-arent-wild-genetic-testing-doctors/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. Roberts, supra note 83.
82. Natasha Gilbert, Why the Devious Defecator Case is a Landmark for US Genetic-Privacy Law,
NATURE (June 25, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/why-the-devious-defecator-case-is-a-landmark-for-usgenetic-privacy-law-1.17857 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act Charges, EEOC, ghttps://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
statistics/enforcement/genetic.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
84. The case, Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1363–64 (N.D. Ga. 2015), gained
some notoriety because of its colorful facts. An employer was trying to figure out which of his employees were
leaving human feces in a warehouse that stored produce. The employer suspected one of the plaintiffs was, as
the court put it, the “devious defecator” and asked the employees to do a cheek-swab. The plaintiffs’ DNA did
not match the DNA of the feces. Despite the reasonableness of wanting to determine who was defecating in the
warehouse, the court held that asking for the cheek-swabs violated GINA. Julie Beck, Genetic Privacy, as
Explained by Mystery Poopers, ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2015/08/the-case-of-the-mystery-pooper-dna-privacy/400355/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group, 102 F.Supp.3d 1360, 1363–64 (N.D. GA 2015).
85. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act Charges, supra note 83; Beck, supra note 86.
86. Robert C. Green, Denise Lautenbach & Amy L. McGuire, GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and
Genomic Medicine, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Jan. 29, 2015).
87. See Morrow supra note 27, at 237–39.
88. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES J. (2016) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. Anya Price, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information One Size Privacy Models May Not Fit
All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 177 (2013).
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information discrimination vary widely, California has secured broader
protections against genetic information discrimination.90
B. CalGINA
Like many states, California has its own genetic information
nondiscrimination law.91 California’s law goes further than federal law,
extending protections in many additional contexts.92 CalGINA’s legislative
history suggests the “range of protections [under federal GINA] incomplete for
Californians” and that the state had a “compelling public interest in realizing the
medical promise of genomics[,] . . . relieving the fear of discrimination[,] and in
prohibiting its actual practice.”93 Much like GINA, CalGINA defines genetic
information as follows:
information about (i) [an] individual’s genetic tests, (ii) The genetic tests
of family members of the individual (iii) The manifestation of a disease
or disorder in family members of the individual . . . [and] includes any
request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical
research that includes genetic services, by an individual or any family
member of the individual.94
Where GINA prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information only in
the health insurance and employment contexts, CalGINA extends that protection
to the following areas: (1) “all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever;”95 (2) access to any “program or activity that is conducted, operated,
or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the
state, or receives any financial assistance from the state;”96 (3) housing, including
mortgage lending and restrictive covenants;97 and (4) the provision of emergency
medical care and services.98 CalGINA also amended the Education Code to
ensure that schools have access to more resources so they can more readily
combat genetic information bias.99 While many states have some level of genetic

90. See infra Part V (discussing CalGINA).
91. See SB 559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261) (adding genetic
information as a protected basis in a number of different contexts).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 1.
94. Id. § 3.
95. Id. 3(b).
96. Id. 6(a).
97. SB 559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., § 16–16.5 (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261).
98. Id. § 3–3.5.
99. Id. § 4(a).
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information discrimination protections in place, most states do not extend them to
public schools.100
C. Genetic Information Discrimination Laws in Other States
Most states have genetic information nondiscrimination laws that are
commensurate with federal law.101 Indeed, 35 states ban genetic information
discrimination in both the health insurance and employment contexts.102 Another
13 states ban genetic information discrimination only in health insurance, which
brings the number of states prohibiting this discrimination to 48.103 In addition,
17 states extend protections to disability insurance, and 15 states provide
protection in the life insurance context.104 Meanwhile, only nine states prohibit
discrimination on the basis of genetic information in long-term care insurance.105
Most states do not prohibit genetic information discrimination in public
schools.106 West Virginia may come the closest since it prohibits collecting
“confidential student information,” which includes genetic information.107 The
West Virginia statute does not address whether or how a school can use genetic
information if it inadvertently obtains it.108 Not only do most states not extend
protections to public schools, but some appear to expressly authorize use of
genetic information in public schools.109
For example, Utah authorizes collecting students’ biometric identifiers or
information on certain conditions.110 The definition of biometric identifier
includes a “human biological sample used for valid scientific testing or
screening,” and the definition of biometric information includes “information . . .
based on an individual’s biometric identifier; and [information] used to identify
[an] individual.”111 Arguably, these definitions would include genetic information
because genetic information is information that can be used to identify an
individual.112 Thus, Utah appears to expressly authorize collecting genetic
100. See infra Part III.C (describing the laws in other states).
101. Price, supra note 91.
102. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 63.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Genome Statute and Legislation Database Search, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/policyethics/legdatabase/pubsearchresult.cfm?content_type=1&content_type_id=1&t
opic_id=1&source_id=1&keyword=education&search=Search (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
107. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-5h(c)(9) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session).
108. Id.
109. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-1406(6) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Fourth Special Session).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 53A-1-1402(3)–(4).
112. See id. § 53A-1-1402 (using the definitions, human biological samples, and information based on
biometric identifiers, both of would seem to include genetic information since DNA is a biological sample and
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information in public schools, and although it regulates the use of that
information, the regulations primarily relate to maintaining disciplinary records
and schedules for expunging.113 California, on the other hand, prohibits denying
access to any “program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by
the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any
financial assistance from the state” on the basis of genetic information
discrimination.114 If that provision includes public schools, then California may
be the only state to extend genetic information protection to public schools.115
IV. CHADAM V. PALO ALTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
In 2012, a Palo Alto school teacher learned one of her students, Colman
Chadam, had genetic markers consistent with Cystic Fibrosis (CF).116 Chadam
did not have CF,117 but two other students at his school did. 118 People with CF
are not supposed to be around each other because they can easily transmit to and
contract from each other a certain kind of bacteria that CF causes them to carry in
their lungs.119 The teacher incorrectly told these other students’ parents that
Chadam had CF, and the parents asked the administration to send Chadam to
another school.120 Although Chadam did not have CF and posed no threat to the
students with CF, the administration complied and sent him to another school.121
Initially, Chadam’s parents sought an injunction in state court but settled
with the school district.122 It appears once the school learned Chadam did not
actually have CF, they let him return to his original school. 123 Ultimately,
Chadam attended the other school for only 11 days before his original school

is used to identify people).
113. Id. § 53A-1-1407.
114. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015–2016
2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
115. Supra Part III.B–C (discussing genetic information protection in California and the rest of the United
States).
116. Andrew Hanson, Genetic Discrimination: A New Frontier, HARV. C.R.–C. L. L. REV. (Feb. 28,
2016), http://harvardcrcl.org/genetic-discrimination-a-new-frontier/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
117. Starr, supra note 4.
118. Zhang, supra note 1.
119. Cross-Infection, CYSTIC FIBROSIS TRUST, https://www.cysticfibrosis.org.uk/life-with-cystic-fibrosis/
cross-infection (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
120. Zhang, supra note 1.
121. Jill Tucker, Boy in School Flap Over Cystic Fibrosis, SFGATE (Nov. 6, 2016, 8:48 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Boy-in-school-flap-over-cystic-fibrosis-3944802.php (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
122. Sue Dremann, Palo Alto DNA-Privacy Case Could Have Wide Implications, PALO ALTO ONLINE
(Jan. 24, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/01/24/palo-alto-dna-privacy-case-couldhave-wide-implications (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
123. Id.
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allowed him to return.124 Despite settling with the school over the original
injunction, the family is later sued the school in federal court, claiming, among
other things, the school violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).125
Specifically, the parents argue that genetic information consistent with a certain
disease constitutes a perceived disability for ADA purposes. 126 The United States
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the school district’s motion to dismiss
and let the ADA claim proceed, which means the argument may prove
successful.127 Because Chadam and the school district settled the initial dispute
and are now litigating the ADA theory, no court has ruled on whether the
school’s conduct was permissible under CalGINA .128 The next Part, therefore,
explores whether CalGINA prohibits the school district’s conduct.129
V. CALGINA’S APPLICATION TO CHADAM’S SITUATION?
In determining whether CalGINA applied to Chadam’s situation, the first
issue is whether public schools fall into one of the additional contexts to which
California extends genetic information discrimination protections.130 Then,
assuming CalGINA does apply to public schools, the next issue is whether
CalGINA prohibited the school’s conduct.131
A. Does CalGINA Apply to Public Schools?
CalGINA adds genetic information to the list of protected bases in California
Government Code section 11135.132 Section 11135, therefore, prohibits
“unlawfully den[ying] full and equal access to . . . or . . . discrimination” on the
basis of, among other things, genetic information in “program[s] or activit[ies]
that [are] conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state
agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from
the state.”133 California Code of Regulations section 11150 defines “funded
124. Tucker, supra note 123.
125. Dremann, supra note 124.
126. Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., 666 F. App’x 615, 616 (9th Cir. 2016).
127. Id. at 617.
128. See supra Part III.B CalGINA (explaining the provision in CalGINA protecting against
discrimination in programs or activities operated or funded by the state, a definition which presumably covers
public schools). As of April 4, 2017, the court had ordered a settlement conference to take place on July 28,
2017. Order Scheduling Settlement Conference at 1, Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 13-4129
CW, 2014 WL 5694080 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2017).
129. Infra Part V.
130. See supra Part V.A (explaining that California may be the only state that extends genetic information
protections to students in public school).
131. Infra Part V.B (discussing whether CalGINA prohibits the school’s conduct in Chadam’s case).
132. SB 559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., § 6(a) (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 11135(a).
133. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
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directly by the state” as “any payment, transfer, or allocation of State funds to
any recipient.”134 “Recipient” is further defined as, among other things, a “local
agency . . . who regularly employs five or more persons and who receives State
support, as defined in [section 11150], in an amount in excess of $10,000 in the
aggregate per State fiscal year or in an amount in excess of $1000 per
transaction.”135 Finally, the definition of “local agency” includes “school
district.”136 Therefore, as long as a school district regularly employs five or more
people and receives more than $10,000 per year from the state, the school district
will be subject to the law.137
Although it is possible for public schools or school districts to not qualify as
a “recipient” either by: (1) not regularly employing five or more people or (2) not
receiving $10,000 during a fiscal year, it seems highly unlikely.138 Even the
smallest California school district, Alpine County Unified School District,
employs at least five people.139 Further, although public schools receive some
funds from local sources, given that the state furnishes nearly 60% of the public
school system’s budget,140 it is hard to imagine the smallest school district not
receiving the requisite $10,000.141 Therefore, the vast majority of public schools,
including Palo Alto Unified School District, satisfy the definition of
“recipient.”142 The next issue is whether public schools are “programs” or
“activities” as defined in CalGINA.143
California Government Code section 11135 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of, among other things, genetic information in “program[s] or activit[ies]
that [are] conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state
agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from
the state.”144 The California Code of Regulations includes “provision of
134. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11150 (2017).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See SB 559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., § 6(a) (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of genetic information in “program[s] or activit[ies]” that are, among other things,
“funded directly by the state”); see also id. (defining “funded directly by the state” and “recipient”).
138. See Administration, ALPINE COUNTY UNIFIED SCH. DISTRICT, http://alpinecoe.k12.ca.us/
administration/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing that
the administration for the smallest school district in the state employs at least six people in its administration,
which does not include the employees at its three schools).
139. Id. (showing that the administration for the smallest school district in the state employs at least six
people in its administration, which does not include the employees at its three schools).
140. Education Budget Facts–CalEdFacts, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fr/eb/
cefedbudget.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
141. Administration, supra note 138; CAL. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 140.
142. Administration, supra note 138 (showing that the administration for the smallest school district in
the state employs at least six people in its administration, which does not include the employees at its three
schools).
143. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (requiring that in order to be subject to the section there must be a
program or activity that is receiving government funds).
144. Id.
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education” in its definition of “program or activities.”145 Therefore, because
public schools provide education, they are a “program or activity” within the
purview of CalGINA.146 Accordingly, because public schools receive state
funding and are a “program” or “activity” for the purposes of CalGINA, they are
subject to the law and cannot unlawfully discriminate on the basis of genetic
information.147 The question that remains then is whether the school’s conduct in
Chadam’s case constituted genetic discrimination under CalGINA.148
B. Does CalGINA Prohibit the School’s Conduct in the Chadam Case?
Whether Chadam’s school violated CalGINA would, it seems, have turned
on: (1) whether the information the school used—the genetic markers—fits the
definition of genetic information in CalGINA; (2) if it does, whether its actions
qualified as discrimination or a denial of equal access to a program or activity;
and (3) if so, whether another law justified its actions.149
The first issue is whether the information the school used falls within
CalGINA’s definition of genetic information.150 CalGINA defines genetic
information as, in part, “information about . . . [an] individual’s genetic tests.”151
It is significant that Chadam had genetic markers consistent with CF.152
Moreover, a genetic test discovered the information.153 Thus, this information is
most likely genetic information under CalGINA.154
The next issue is whether the school’s use of the information violated
CalGINA.155 CalGINA does not allow programs and activities that receive
government funding to unlawfully deny full and equal access or unlawfully
discriminate on the basis of genetic information.156 In Chadam’s case, the
school’s actions arguably fit both the denying access and discrimination prongs

145. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11150 (2017).
146. See id. (including in its definition of “program or activities” the “provision of education,” which
schools do); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic
information in “programs or activities” receiving government funding).
147. Education Budget Facts–CalEdFacts, supra note 142; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 11150 (2017); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
148. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (prohibiting discrimination, which the school would not have
violated if they did not discriminate notwithstanding the fact that they are subject to CalGINA).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. (defining genetic information the same way section 51 of the Civil Code does); see also SB
559, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess., § 6(a) (Cal. 2011) (enacted by Chapter 261) (defining genetic information).
152. Hanson, supra note 118.
153. Id.
154. See Starr, supra note 4 (explaining that doctors completed genetic tests on Chadam as a young child
when they were trying to diagnose a heart condition, and that his mother volunteered this information to the
school when she enrolled him there).
155. Infra Part V.B.2 (discussing whether the school’s use of Chadam’s information violated CalGINA).
156. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
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because he was denied access to the school he was attending because of his
genetic information.157 The school district, on the other hand, could have argued
that Chadam retained access to a school—just not Jordan Middle School.158 But
Chadam might nonetheless have countered that being allowed in every school
except one is not full and equal access under CalGINA.159 Regardless, even if the
school district successfully proved it did not unlawfully deny Chadam full and
equal access, Chadam still would have had an excellent argument that the school
district discriminated against him because of his genetic information.160 It is
unclear exactly how a court would have decided the case, but the fact that
Chadam’s family and PAUSD settled after the family originally sought an
injunction might suggest that the school district did not think it had strong
case.161 In addition, given that the school district’s belief that Chadam had CF
was the impetus behind sending him to another school, it appears as though the
reason they later reversed course is because they learned that Chadam did not
actually have CF.162 Ultimately, given the language of the statute and the facts of
Chadam’s case, the school likely violated CalGINA.163
Assuming the school district unlawfully discriminated against Chadam on the
basis of his genetic information, the issue remains whether there is an exception
that might have justified the school’s actions.164 For example, the California
Education Code authorizes school officials to send a student home if “there is a
good reason to believe that the child is suffering from a recognized contagious or
infectious disease.”165 Such a student “shall not be permitted to return until the
school authorities are satisfied that any contagious or infectious disease does not
exist.”166 It seems, therefore, that the school district not only had the authority to
send Chadam home or, presumably, to another school, but also had an
affirmative duty to prevent his return until it knew he was no longer

157. See supra Part IV (describing Chadam’s story and how Jordan Middle School sent him to another
school for 11 days because of his genetic information).
158. See supra Part IV (describing that PAUSD did not deny Chadam access to all schools in the
district—just the one he currently attended).
159. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (prohibiting denial of full and equal access to public schools on
the basis of genetic information).
160. See id. (prohibiting denial of full and equal access to public schools on the basis of genetic
information).
161. See supra Part IV (noting that the family settled with PAUSD after filing an injunction); see also
supra Part V.B.2 (discussing whether the school’s actions violated CalGINA).
162. Dremann, supra note 124.
163. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (prohibiting denial of full and equal access to public schools on
the basis of genetic information); see also supra Part VII (describing how Chadam’s school sent him to another
school for 11 days because of his genetic information).
164. Infra Part VIII.B.3.
165. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (West, Westlaw current with all 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015–2016
2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
166. Id.
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contagious.167 The school district raised this defense before the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, but the court dismissed the case on
other grounds and did not rule on that issue.168 The lack of a ruling on how
section 49451 relates to CalGINA warrants a brief discussion of whether section
49451 might have justified the school’s actions.169
Chadam did not have CF.170 Therefore, there was no contagious or infectious
disease.171 Nonetheless, the fact that Chadam did not actually have CF does not
render this defense moot because the statute is based, in part, on the school’s
reasonable belief.172 Thus, if the school reasonably believed that Chadam had CF,
its conduct seems to fall under section 49451.173 But as the Chadams point out in
their brief to the Ninth Circuit, once the students with CF’s parents found out
about Chadam’s genetic markers, the school waited nearly a month before it sent
him to the other school.174 Had they sent him to another school immediately,
perhaps PAUSD would have had a strong argument that they reasonably believed
Chadam posed a risk of infection to the other students with CF.175 But this delay
cuts against the proposition that section 49451 justified PAUSD’s conduct
because it suggests they did not actually believe he posed an imminent threat to
the other students with CF.176 Moreover, even if the school district did
subjectively and honestly believe Chadam posed some sort of threat to other
students, such belief seems considerably less reasonable in light of the monthlong delay.177 This delay demonstrates PAUSD had time to learn the truth it
ultimately discovered: Chadam did not actually have CF and, therefore, posed no
threat to the other students.178 Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that section
49451 alone would exonerate PAUSD.179
167. Id.
168. Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 13-4129 CW, 2014 WL 5694080, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 4, 2014), a’ff’d in part, r’ev’d in part and remanded, Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified School District, 666 F.
App’x 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Chadam, supra note 128, at 617 (not addressing the district court’s
decision to not address the argument based on California Education Code § 49451).
169. See Chadam, supra note 128, at 617 (not addressing the district court’s decision to not address the
argument based on California Education Code section 49451).
170. Id..
171. Id.; Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 13-4129 CW, 2014 WL 5694080, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2014), a’ff’d in part, r’ev’d in part and remanded).
172. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (using the language “good reason to believe”).
173. See id. (using the language “good reason to believe”).
174. Brief for Petitioner at *5–10, Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-17384, 2016 WL
6694941 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2016) (detailing the timeline between when the school and parents found out about
Chadam’s genetic markers and when the school pulled Chadam from class).
175. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (using the language “good reason to believe”).
176. See id. (using the language “good reason to believe”); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at *5–
10 (detailing the timeline between when the school and parents found out about Chadam’s genetic markers and
when the school pulled Chadam from class).
177. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 176, at *5–10 (detailing the timeline between when the school
and parents found out about Chadam’s genetic markers and when the school pulled Chadam from class).
178. Id. (detailing the timeline between when the school and parents found out about Chadam’s genetic

325

2018 / Genetic Information Discrimination in Public Schools
In sum, there is a compelling argument that CalGINA applies to public
schools and would have prohibited PAUSD’s conduct.180 Why the Chadams did
not pursue a claim under CalGINA is not perfectly clear.181 Regardless, because
Chadam did not actually have CF, one cannot help but wonder what the outcome
would have been if Chadam had actually had CF.182 The remainder of this
Comment uses a factual variation of Chadam’s case—in which Chadam has
CF—to explore whether an applicable exception to CalGINA that would have
permitted the school’s conduct exists, and if not, whether one should, and what it
should be.183
VI. WHAT IF CHADAM HAD CYSTIC FIBROSIS?
Had Chadam been diagnosed with CF, he would have posed a risk to
students with CF at his school because people with CF often have various strands
of a bacteria in their lungs that are commonly called pseudomonas.184
Pseudomonas are generally not a threat to people who do not have CF, but people
with the condition are especially capable of both transmitting pseudomonas to
other people with CF and particularly susceptible to contracting pseudomonas
from other people with CF.185 Consequently, it is generally recommended that
people with CF not meet face to face and keep at least six feet away from each
other.186 Therefore, if Chadam had CF, the school would have had to keep him
and other students with CF separate from each other.187 Perhaps this would have
markers and when the school pulled Chadam from class).
179. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (using the language “good reason to believe”); see Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 176, at *5–10 (detailing the timeline between when the school and parents found out
about Chadam’s genetic markers and when the school pulled Chadam from class).
180. See supra Part V.B.1 (concluding that the school used genetic information); Part V(B)(2)
(concluding that the school’s actions violated CalGINA); Part V.B.3 (concluding that section 49451 does not
provide an independent justification for the school’s actions).
181. Jennifer Wagner, Genetic Discrimination Case Against School District is Appealed to Ninth Circuit,
GENOMICS L. REP. (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2016/02/02/geneticdiscrimination-case-against-school-district-is-appealed-to-ninth-circuit/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); but see Jon Brooks, Alleged Genetic Discrimination at California School Strikes a Nerve,
Raises More Questions, KQED SCIENCE (Feb. 10, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/futureofyou/2016/02/10/allegedgenetic-discrimination-at-california-school-strikes-a-nerve-and-raises-more-questions/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that Chadam’s attorney wants a ruling that will affect more than
just California).
182. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing the impact of, among other things, the fact that Chadam did not
have CF).
183. See infra Part VI, VII (discussing what would have happened if Chadam did have CF and proposing
language for an exception that would justify the school’s conduct if he had).
184. Cross-Infection, supra note 121.
185. Id.
186. Dr. Daniel J. James, Cystic Fibrosis Patients Losing a Connection, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 11, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/11/18/cystic-fibrosis-patients-losingconnection/vl06v1Je4DiI5CLjNLMrMP/story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
187. Id.
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been possible at Chadam’s school, but to foster a CalGINA analysis and any
potential exceptions that might apply to this hypothetical situation, this Comment
assumes ensuring Chadam and the other students with CF were never within six
feet of each other was unfeasible, unrealistic, or too risky.188 Moreover, this
Comment will not explore whether there were other options the school might
have taken, but will instead focus on whether there is an exception that would
have justified sending Chadam to another school, and if not, whether an
exception should be created.189 The following section addresses whether section
49451 would have justified the school’s conduct if Chadam had CF.190
A. Would Section 49451 Have Justified PAUSD’s Conduct if Chadam Had
Cystic Fibrosis?
Curently, CalGINA does not provide an exemption that would allow a school
to discriminate against a student based on genetic information in certain
circumstances where it would otherwise be prohibited.191 Therefore, if there is an
exemption that might have justified PAUSD sending a student with CF to another
school, it would be in a source independent of CalGINA.192 Section 49451 of the
California Education Code is relevant because it permits school officials to send
students home when they have “good reason to believe that the child is suffering
from a recognized contagious or infectious disease,” and the student “shall not be
permitted to return until the school authorities are satisfied that any contagious or
infectious disease does not exist.”193 While the analysis of section 49451 in the
actual case turned on the reasonableness of the school’s belief,194 this
hypothetical does not because the student has CF.195 Rather, the key issue is
simply whether the school’s conduct would otherwise have satisfied the
statute.196

188. Infra Part VI, VII (discussing, respectively, what would have happened if Chadam did have CF and
a proposed exception).
189. Infra Parts VI, VII (discussing what would have happened if Chadam had CF and if there should be
an exception that would have justified the school’s conduct if he did).
190. Infra Part VI.A (discussing whether California Education Code § 49451 would have functioned as
an exception to CalGINA that would have justified the school’s conduct).
191. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
192. See id. (prohibiting only unlawful denial of access to or discrimination within programs and
activities receiving government funding).
193. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451.
194. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing § 49451’s application to Chadam’s case).
195. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (permitting schools to send a student home if the school has good
reason to believe the student has a “contagious or infectious disease,” which is effectively satisfied if the student
does indeed have such a disease).
196. See id. (permitting schools to send a student home if the school has good reason to believe the
student has a “contagious or infectious disease,” which is effectively satisfied if the student does indeed have
such a disease).
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An in-depth and medically technical discussion on whether CF constitutes a
contagious or infectious disease could easily mire this analysis.197 This is
especially true because our hypothetical student is at risk of transmitting the
bacteria CF causes him to retain in his lungs, rather than CF itself.198 Because
people with CF can easily transmit the pseudomonas bacteria to each other, this
comment assumes the pseudomonas bacteria constitutes an infectious or
contagious disease.199 Moreover, although neither section 49451 nor the
Education Code defines an “infectious or contagious disease,” section 1250.4 of
the California Health & Safety Code defines “[c]ommunicable, contagious, or
infectious disease” as “any disease that is capable of being transmitted from
person to person with or without contact and as established by the State
Department of Health Services pursuant to California Code of Regulations, Title
17, sections 120130 and 2500.”200 Assuming that the definition in section 1250.4
or a similar definition is the relevant standard, the pseudomonas probably satisfy
the definition because people with CF can transmit them so easily between one
another.201
Assuming the terms of section 49451 are satisfied, the next issue is how
section 49451 and CalGINA interact.202 Notwithstanding CalGINA, the power to
send kids home under section 49451 focuses a school’s authority when a parent
has not consented to their child’s physical exam, rather than a school’s decision
based on genetic information.203 It is important to note California Government
Code section 11135, the section where CalGINA added genetic information as a
protected basis, only prohibits “unlawful[] deni[al of] full and equal access to . . .
[and] . . . unlawful[] . . . discrimination [within] any program or activity that is
conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is
funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state
(emphasis added).”204 Sending a student home under the authority of section

197. See id. (permitting schools to send a student home if the student has a “contagious or infectious
disease”).
198. Cross-Infection, supra note 121.
199. Id.; CAL. EDU. CODE § 49451.
200. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250.4 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through
Ch. 4 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). Section 2500 of Title 17 of the California Code of regulations further defines
‘communicable disease’ as “an illness due to a specific microbiological or parasitic agent or its toxic products
which arises through transmission of that agent or its products from an infected person, animal, or inanimate
reservoir to a susceptible host, either directly or indirectly through an intermediate plant or animal host, vector,
or the inanimate environment.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 2500 (2017). Pursuant to § 120130 of the California
Health and Safety Code, the California State Department of Health and Safety Code developed a list of diseases
(also found in Title 17 of the California Code of Regulations), and the list does not appear to expressly mention
the pseudomonas associated with CF. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 2550–2640 (2017).
201. Cross-Infection, supra note 121.
202. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (failing to reference section 49451 of the California Education
Code); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (failing to reference California government Code section 11135).
203. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451.
204. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
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49451 would be lawful.205 Therefore, if the reason a school sends a student home
is a genetic condition, such as CF, which the school learned of through genetic
information they lawfully possessed, it would seem the school’s conduct,
although technically discriminatory, would constitute “lawful discrimination”
and be permitted under CalGINA .206 Nonetheless, the exceptions to CalGINA
should be clearer.207 Accordingly, the next Part discusses what an appropriate
exception to CalGINA or a similar prospective statute in other states might look
like.208
VII. A BETTER WAY
Schools should be able to protect students who are put at risk by another
student because of a disease or condition the other student has.209 The fact that a
school learns such information from genetic information should not preclude the
school from protecting students.210 Admittedly, California Education Code
section 49451 may furnish an exception to CalGINA that would have permitted
the school’s conduct if Chadam actually had CF.211 But legislators should add an
explicit exception to CalGINA for clarity and simplicity.212 In addition, states
considering legislation similar to CalGINA should take note of Chadam’s
situation and include an exception that would authorize schools to protect
students where a school learns through genetic information that a student has a
disease or condition that puts other students at risk.213 While there seems to be a
dearth of examples of cases similar to Chadam’s, that dearth is most likely
attributable to the fact that California is the only state that prohibits genetic
information discrimination in public schools.214
Of course, genetic information discrimination laws should provide a level of
protection sufficient to ensure students are not mindlessly, maliciously, or
arbitrarily removed from their schools under the pretext of a dangerous medical

205. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451.
206. Id.; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
207. See supra Part VI (explaining the potential relationship between California Government Code
section 11135 and California Education Code section 49451, neither of which reference each other).
208. See infra Part VII (proposing language for a clearer exception to CalGINA or to be included in
similar legislation elsewhere).
209. See supra Part VI (discussing the dangers that people with cystic fibrosis pose to each other).
210. See supra Part VI (explaining that existing California law probably prevents this, but noting that it
could be ensured by creating an explicit exception within CalGINA).
211. See supra Part VI.A (exploring the how §49451 would have applied if Chadam did have CF).
212. See supra Part VI (discussing what would have happened if Chadam had actually had CF and
thereby demonstrating the need for a clearer cut exception to CalGINA).
213. See supra Part III.B (explaining that there do not appear to be any other states that extend genetic
information protections to public schools).
214. See supra Part III.B (explaining that California is the only state that prohibits genetic information
discrimination in public schools).
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condition.215 Therefore, the exception should be narrow.216 But the risks of a
dystopian, genetically engineered future should not prevent legislators from
ensuring that schools can protect students from legitimate risks posed by other
students, even if doing so would otherwise constitute genetic information
discrimination.217 One standard that might suffice is that of section 49451, under
which a school must have “good reason to believe that a student has a recognized
contagious or infectious disease” before the school can send the student home.218
Although the words “contagious” and “infectious” may imply there must be a
risk of harm to other students to meet the standard, adding an “imminent risk of
harm” component would be prudent to ensure students are only removed if there
is truly a reason to do so.219 In addition, since California Government Code
section 11135 is phrased in terms of prohibiting “unlawful” discrimination, the
exception should be phrased in terms of what constitutes lawful genetic
information discrimination in public schools.220 A model exception that
California should add to CalGINA and that other states should include in similar
prospective legislation might read as follows: “Conduct that would otherwise
qualify as discrimination on the basis of genetic information in public schools
under CalGINA is lawful if school officials learn or reasonably believe, through
or because of genetic information, a student has a contagious or infectious
disease or condition that poses an imminent risk of harm to another student or
students.”221 This language ensures that a school with multiple students who have
CF could act to protect those students without risking a genetic information
discrimination suit.222
VIII. CONCLUSION
Breakthroughs in genetic research promise great benefits in the form of
personalized medical treatment, but also pose potential risks because genetic

215. See supra Part IV (detailing the facts of Chadam’s case, which is exactly what prospective
legislation should prevent).
216. See supra Part IV (detailing the facts of Chadam’s case, which is exactly what prospective
legislation should prevent and should not be allowed to occur through an overly broad exception).
217. See supra Part VI (explaining the risks that students with CF pose to each other, a danger schools
should be allowed to take actions to avoid).
218. See supra Part VI.A (concluding that the language in § 49451 is probably sufficient to justify a
school’s conduct in a situation like that of PAUSD if Chadam had actually had CF as lawful discrimination
pursuant to section 11135 of the California Government Code).
219. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49451 (not explicitly conditioning the authority to send a student home for
medical reasons on the risk that student’s condition poses to other students).
220. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a).
221. See supra Part VI, VII (explaining what would happen if Chadam had actually had CF, which
demonstrates the need for an exception to existing law, which this language would accomplish).
222. See supra Part X (explaining the need for a clearer exception in California law and in prospective
legislation elsewhere).
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information can be used as a basis for discrimination.223 Laws at both the federal
and state level ban discrimination on the basis of genetic information in a variety
of contexts.224 California law extends this protection to public schools.225
California Education Code section 49451 did not permit PAUSD’s conduct in
Chadam’s case.226 Had Chadam been diagnosed with CF, however, section 49451
may have justified the school’s conduct because of the risk he and the other
students with CF would have posed to each other.227 Nonetheless, while
protecting students in public schools from genetic information discrimination is
an admirable goal, California and other state legislatures considering similar
legislation should fashion an explicit and narrow exception that allows schools to
protect students from legitimate medical risks.228

223. See Jungreis, supra note 25, at 211–12.
224. See supra Part III (exploring federal, California, Utah, and West Virginia law, and describing some
general trends across the rest of the states).
225. See supra Part V.A (concluding that CalGINA applies to public schools).
226. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing whether § 49451 justified the school’s conduct in Chadam’s case).
227. See supra Part VI.A (explaining that § 49451 might have justified the school’s conduct if Chadam
had actually had CF).
228. See supra Part VII (proposing language that would have justified the school’s conduct in Chadam’s
case if he had actually had CF).

331

